The recent Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis (muldrow) drastically lowered the standard that district courts had previously applied to discriminatory transfers brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As courts increasingly interpret Muldrow to apply beyond job transfers, employers must be vigilant about the potential legal implications and ensure their practices align with the evolving standards of discrimination law. Below is a discussion of the Supreme Court’s holding and the consequences this decision has on employers moving forward.
Muldrow Facts
The plaintiff in Muldrow, Sergeant Jatonya Clayborne Muldrow, worked with the St. Louis Police Department when she was transferred to another department. While the plaintiff’s pay and rank within the police department remained the same, she no longer worked with high-ranking officials, lost access to her unmarked take-home vehicle and special FBI-related privileges, and her schedule became irregular and included weekend shifts.
After being replaced by a male employee, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit under Title VII, alleging that the transfer to a new position had discriminated against her based on sex, with respect to the terms and conditions of her employment. The primary issue the Supreme Court had to decide was what level of harm a plaintiff must show they suffered to succeed under a Title VII claim.
Supreme Court’s Ruling
The Supreme Court rejected the idea that a plaintiff is required to prove the harm they incurred was “significant,” “substantial,” or “serious.” The Court held that nothing in Title VII’s discrimination provision speaks to how much worse off the employee must become due to the employer’s adverse employment actions. A plaintiff need only show that “some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment” occurred. This harm does not need to be tangible or economic, but it must have caused the plaintiff to suffer a disadvantageous change in their employment.
The adverse employment action must have been based on protected characteristics such as race, sex, or religion. Title VII targets the employment practice that treats an employee worse because of the protected characteristics; the law does not distinguish between significant and less significant harms.
National Effect
The Supreme Court limited its analysis to adverse employment actions involving lateral job transfers. The Court did not state whether this decision would apply to all employment actions. However, Circuit and District Courts across the country have interpreted Muldrow to apply to a vast degree of employer conduct.
Although the Second Circuit has yet to publish an opinion interpreting the rule in Muldrow, New York District Courts have applied the opinion to decide matters concerning adverse employment actions that go well beyond job transfers. The Eastern District of New York used Muldrow in determining whether an employer’s conduct that threatened to modify a pregnant employee’s position to part-time, denied the employee’s overtime request, and relocated her workstation to the back of the office, amounted to sex and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII.
Not only are New York courts applying the ruling in Muldrow to various employment actions, but it is also being utilized in cases brought under the New York Human Rights Laws, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. For example, the Southern District of New York recently interpreted Muldrow to decide that the Second Circuit’s ruling that an adverse employment action be “materially significant” to allege an adverse discrimination claim is no longer required. Moreover, it held that claims brought under Section 1981 can also be evaluated under the Muldrow rule.
The Third Circuit, governing states such as New Jersey and Pennsylvania, has also expanded the application of Muldrow. In Piefer v. Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit applied Muldrow to a case arising under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and Title VII where the employer refused to accommodate a disabled pregnant employee. In Perry v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, the Third Circuit used Muldrow in a case that involved allegations of racial discrimination and retaliation.
Impact on Cases
While courts have decided to broaden the use of Muldrow to apply to cases assessing various employment decisions and different laws, the decision has not made it easier for plaintiffs to succeed in their legal claims. For example, New York courts have routinely dismissed both Title VII and New York Human Rights lawsuits because the plaintiffs have failed to allege an adverse employment action that can support a discrimination claim. Justice Alito and Thomas’ impression that lower courts would not apply the “some harm” standard any differently than the “significant harm” standard has proven to be true thus far.
Takeaway
The Supreme Court’s decision in Muldrow marks a significant shift in how courts evaluate discrimination claims under Title VII. By establishing that plaintiffs only need to demonstrate “some harm” rather than substantial harm, the ruling broadens the scope of adverse employment actions that can lead to successful discrimination claims. However, despite this lower standard, plaintiffs still face challenges in proving their cases, as courts continue to dismiss claims when adverse employment actions are not clearly articulated by the plaintiff. Employers must remain vigilant, understanding that actions previously deemed inconsequential may now have legal implications under Title VII and related laws. This evolving landscape underscores the importance of fair employment practices and proactive measures to ensure compliance with discrimination laws.